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Abstract Moral luck occurs when factors beyond an agent’s control positively
affect how much praise or blame she deserves. Kinds of moral luck are differen-
tiated by the source of lack of control such as the results of her actions, the cir-
cumstances in which she finds herself, and the way in which she is constituted.
Many philosophers accept the existence of some of these kinds of moral luck but not
others, because, in their view, the existence of only some of them would make
morality unfair. I, however, argue that this intermediary approach is unstable,
because either morality is fair in ways that rule out resultant, circumstantial, and
constitutive moral luck (and this leads to moral responsibility skepticism), or
morality is unfair in ways that permit the existence of those kinds of moral luck.
Thus, such intermediary approaches lack the motivation that their proponents have
long taken them to have. In the appendix, I point to ways in which morality is unfair
concerning the scope of moral responsibility, moral obligation, moral taint, being a
good or bad person, and flourishing.
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the source of lack of control such as the results of her actions, the circumstances in
which she finds herself, and the way in which she is constituted (Nagel 1979,
p. 28).2 Many philosophers allow some of those three kinds of moral luck to exist
but not others, and a popular reason why is that if certain kinds of moral luck were
to exist, morality would be unjust or unfair (Statman 1993, pp. 2, 3). I, however,
argue that this intermediary approach is unstable, because either morality is fair in
ways that rule out resultant, circumstantial, and constitutive moral luck (and this
leads to moral responsibility skepticism), or morality is unfair in ways that permit
the existence of all three kinds of moral luck. But then, the most common positions
in the moral luck debate—namely, the positions that affirm some kinds of moral
luck and deny others—cannot appeal to the unfairness objection to motivate their
denial of only some kinds of moral luck. Thus, such intermediary approaches lack
the motivation that their proponents have long taken them to have.
I proceed as follows. In the first two sections, I define and illustrate the canonical
kinds of moral luck, and present the strongest version of the unfairness objection to
moral luck. After these explications, I present a more precise outline of my
argument. In the next three sections, I consider several intermediary positions on
moral luck and argue that each is unmotivated with respect to the ideal of fairness. I
offer some concluding thoughts, and, subsequently, I provide an appendix on
several ways in which morality is unfair with respect to moral properties other than
degree of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness.
1 Categories of moral luck
Thomas Nagel’s (1979, p. 28) taxonomy of moral luck includes resultant,
circumstantial, constitutive, and causal moral luck.3 Resultant moral luck occurs
when an agent performs an action or omission with a consequence that is at least
partially beyond her control and that consequence positively affects her praisewor-
thiness or blameworthiness. By ‘positively affects’, I mean that the luck at issue
does not undermine praiseworthiness or blameworthiness.4 Here is an example.
Killer, our first character, is at a party and drives home drunk. At a certain point in
Footnote 1 continued
writing on moral luck, however, tend to focus on the particular moral status of deserved praise and blame.
For expositional simplicity, I have defined moral luck to focus on this particular moral status. Importantly,
however, there are other kinds of moral luck where the ‘moral’ refers to moral obligation, virtue,
flourishing, or some other moral property, and I consider several of these other moral properties in the
appendix.
2 I consider Nagel’s fourth kind of moral luck involving causal determinism in the next section.
3 The term ‘resultant luck’ is from Zimmerman (1987, p. 376), and ‘causal luck’ is from Statman (1993,
p. 11).
4 This part of my definition is in keeping with the italicized part of Nagel’s (1979, p. 26) own idea:
‘‘[A] significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, [and] yet we
continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment’’ (italics mine). One way in which my
definition departs from Nagel’s is that it focuses on praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, and not
praising and blaming.
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her journey, she swerves, hits the curb, and kills a pedestrian who was on the curb.
Merely Reckless, our second character, is exactly like Killer in every way, but,
when she swerves and hits a curb, she kills no one. There was no pedestrian on the
curb for her to kill. The difference between Killer and Merely Reckless is a matter
of luck. Is Killer more blameworthy—that is, does she deserve more blame—than
Merely Reckless? If Killer is more blameworthy, this would be a case of resultant
moral luck, and if they are equally blameworthy, this would not be a case of
resultant moral luck.
Circumstantial moral luck occurs when it is outside of the agent’s control
whether she faces a morally significant challenge or opportunity, and it positively
affects her praiseworthiness or blameworthiness. Here are two more examples. No
Start, our third character, gets drunk and gets into her car in exactly the same way as
our first two characters, but the difference is that her car does not start. As a result,
she has to call a cab to take her home. But if No Start’s engine had turned over, she
would have driven drunk just as they did. By stipulation, it is beyond No Start’s
control that her car fails to start, and it is outside of Merely Reckless’s control that
her car does start. Works Tonight, our fourth character, has the same moral
character as Killer, Merely Reckless, and No Start, and so Works Tonight would
have gotten drunk and driven home if she had gone to the party as she had planned.
Works Tonight, however, was called in to work, and was thereby saved from
disgrace. Of course, it is a matter of luck that Works Tonight was called into work,
and that the other three were not. Are No Start and Works Tonight as blameworthy
as Merely Reckless?5 If Merely Reckless is more blameworthy than No Start and
No Start is more blameworthy than Works Tonight, then circumstantial moral luck
would exist in both cases, because luck in opportunity would make a moral
responsibility-relevant difference. If, however, all three of them are equally
blameworthy, then circumstantial moral luck would not exist in these cases; and all
three would be exactly as blameworthy as Killer too if resultant moral luck also
does not exist.
Constitutive moral luck occurs when an agent’s dispositions or capacities are not
voluntarily acquired, and they positively affect her praiseworthiness or blamewor-
thiness for a trait or an action. Scarred Childhood, our fifth character, had a father
who was killed by a drunk driver, and she subconsciously developed the policy
never to drive drunk. If that traumatic experience had not occurred, however,
Scarred Childhood would have had a different character and would have formed the
intention to drive drunk at the party as the others do. Of course, it is outside Scarred
Childhood’s control that she had this traumatic experience, and it is outside of
Killer, Merely Reckless, No Start, and Work Tonight’s control that they never had
that kind of traumatic experience. Is Scarred Childhood as blameworthy as the
5 Why use two cases of circumstantial luck? Whether the case of Merely Reckless and No Start is a case
of circumstantial or resultant luck depends on what actions are (see Nelkin 2013). If actions are purely
mental events, it would be a case of resultant luck; they performed the same mental actions with different
consequences. If actions are overt bodily actions, it would be a case of circumstantial luck, because they
would have performed the same actions in the same circumstances but were not in the same
circumstances.
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others? If Merely Reckless and No Start are each more blameworthy than Scarred
Childhood, then constitutive moral luck would exist in this case. But if all five of
our characters turn out to be equally blameworthy, then there would be no
constitutive moral luck (and no circumstantial and resultant moral luck either).6
Causal moral luck occurs when the laws of nature and past states of affairs that
are outside of a person’s control causally determine what she does, and thereby
positively affect her praiseworthiness or blameworthiness.7 The question of whether
causal moral luck could exist is the same question as whether an action’s having
been causally determined is compatible with being morally responsible for that
action, which is a standard topic in the free will literature. The moral luck debate
proper, however, is about resultant, circumstantial, and constitutive moral luck,
because these are the kinds of luck that make the problem of moral luck a distinctive
problem.8 Although it can be illuminating to consider whether causal moral luck
exists alongside these three (see Hartman 2017, pp. 53–55, 71–80), I ignore this
complexity about causal moral luck for the time being, and return to it at the
conclusion of the essay.
2 The absolute fairness objection to moral luck
The strongest version of the unfairness objection to moral luck is that it is unfair for
any one of Killer, Merely Reckless, No Start, Works Tonight, and Scarred
Childhood to be more blameworthy than any of the others, because the salient
difference between them is a matter of luck and morality must be protected from all
kinds of luck.9
The nature of this absolutely fair conception of morality involves a requirement
for total equality of moral opportunity and a kind of pure agency.10 According to
Bernard Williams’s (1981, p. 21) description of that conception, ‘‘The successful
moral life … is presented as a career open not merely to the talents, but to a talent
which all rational beings necessarily possess in the same degree.’’ Thus, bad
upbringings, tumultuous circumstances, and tragic consequences are not factors that
foreclose opportunities to live successful moral lives; they do not even make it more
difficult to do so. As Williams asserts,
6 I take this claim to be compatible with the skeptical position that none of them are blameworthy for
anything. See, for example, Levy (2011), Strawson (1994), and Waller (2011).
7 Causal luck could be defined in a broader way to include also the indeterminism highlighted by the luck
objection to libertarianism (cf. Mele 2006; van Iwagen 2002). I ignore this complexity.
8 For more about the distinctiveness of these problems, see Hartman (2017, pp. 4–9).
9 It is not uncommon for philosophers to appeal to fairness as a norm that governs desert,
blameworthiness, and being responsible (Levy 2014, p. 126; Rosen 2002; Wallace 1994). For a
challenge to Wallace (1994) and Rosen (2002), see Graham (2014).
10 The term ‘‘absolutely fair’’ is from Russell (2008, p. 316). And as Otsuka (2009, p. 374) recognizes,
‘morality’ in this context refers only to praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, and not also to other moral
properties such as moral virtue and vice.
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Anything which is the product of happy or unhappy contingency is no proper
object of moral assessment, and no proper determinant of it, either (1981,
p. 20).
There is pressure within it [our conception of morality] to require a voluntariness
that will be total and will cut through character and psychological or social
determination, and allocate blame and responsibility on the ultimately fair basis
of the agent’s own contribution, no more and no less (1985, p. 194).
On this absolutely fair view, the moral praise and blame that we deserve cannot be
conditioned by lucky factors outside of our control such as our genetic make-up,
moral training, social pressure, opportunity, results, and the like.11 It seems very
plausible to think that an agent can be morally responsible on this view only if she
created herself out of nothing, because it is only then that her agency would be pure
in the right kind of way and everyone would have the very same moral opportunities
to deserve praise and avoid blame, at least with respect to their interior constitution.
This strong self-creation condition on morally responsible agency, however, cannot
possibly be satisfied (see Strawson 1994). So, the absolutely fair conception of
morality not only implies that no resultant, circumstantial, or constitutive moral luck
exist, but also that it is impossible for anyone to be morally responsible for anything.
Williams rejects the absolutely fair conception of morality, regarding the
impossibility of satisfying it as a reductio. Other philosophers such as Nagel and
Galen Strawson, however, accept these fairness-based requirements as a deliverance
of common sense. On the one hand, Nagel (1979, p. 34) endorses a paradox, because
he affirms these requirements that are impossible to satisfy and still believes that we
are morally responsible for at least some of what we do. On the other hand,
Strawson (1994) straightforwardly concludes from those requirements that it is
impossible to be morally responsible for anything (cf. Levy 2011; Waller 2011).
Most philosophers in the moral luck debate part ways with Nagel and Strawson
precisely because they believe that it is at least metaphysically possible for us to be
morally responsible agents without affirming a Nagelian paradox. These philosophers
allow at least some kinds of moral luck to exist in order to support morally responsible
agency, but many of them deny that certain other kinds of moral luck exist on the
grounds that their existence would make morality unfair. Over the next three sections, I
argue that the fairness-based justification for such intermediary views is unstable,
because there is no fairness-relevant difference between the kinds of moral luck that
they accept and the kinds that they reject. If my argument is successful, then the
proponents of these intermediary views should either (1) embrace absolute fairness as
the standard of morality, and so embrace responsibility skepticism or the Nagelian
paradox, or (2) agree that there is no good objection to constitutive, circumstantial, or
resultant moral luck on grounds of fairness. In Hartman (2017, forthcoming), I argue
against taking the first horn (see also Sher 2005; Russell 2008, 2017). If philosophers
who occupy these intermediary positions take the second horn, at least some of them
11 Not everyone in the moral responsibility literature accepts the assumptions about control that animate
the problem of moral luck. See, for example, Smith (2005) and McKenna (2008).
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will have good motivation to abandon their positions, because a common motivation
for rejecting moral luck is on grounds of fairness.12
3 Allowing only essential constitutive moral luck
A central feature of Michael Zimmerman’s (2002, pp. 560, 561) response to the
problem of moral luck distinguishes between the ‘‘degree’’ and ‘‘scope’’ of moral
responsibility (cf. Peels 2015, p. 74). The degree of moral responsibility is about
how much praise or blame a person deserves, and this kind of moral responsibility is
luck-free. But the scope of responsibility concerns the events for which an agent is
morally responsible, and this sense of moral responsibility is not luck-free.
Zimmerman uses the degree/scope distinction as well as true subjunctive
conditionals of freedom to eliminate all resultant and circumstantial moral luck
and almost all constitutive moral luck.13
Let us start with the way in which Zimmerman uses the degree/scope distinction
to eliminate resultant moral luck. Because the only difference between Killer and
Merely Reckless is a matter of luck and luck is irrelevant to degree of moral
responsibility, the degree of their moral responsibility is the same (Zimmerman
2002, pp. 560–562; cf. Enoch and Marmor 2007, pp. 408–420; Peels 2015, p. 83).
But the scope of their moral responsibility differs, because only Killer is morally
responsible for the death of a pedestrian. Killer is morally responsible for more
things, but they are equally blameworthy. Thus, no resultant moral luck exists in this
case, because the actual results of a person’s actions that are outside of her control
do not affect her degree of praiseworthiness or blameworthiness.
Next, consider the way in which Zimmerman uses the degree/scope distinction
and true subjunctive conditionals of freedom to eliminate circumstantial moral luck.
Because the salient difference between Merely Reckless, No Start, and Works
Tonight is a matter of luck with respect to whether the car starts or having to work,
the degree of their moral responsibility is the same; all three are equally
blameworthy (Zimmerman 2002, pp. 564, 565; cf. Enoch and Marmor 2007,
pp. 420–425; Peels 2015, pp. 79, 80). Nevertheless, the scope of their moral
12 My argument is similar in various ways to Moore’s (1997) argument for resultant moral luck. Here is
Moore’s argument: if resultant moral luck does not exist, then circumstantial, constitutive, and causal
moral luck do not exist either. Nevertheless, at least circumstantial, constitutive, or causal moral luck
exists. Therefore, resultant moral luck also exists. Moore (1997, p. 237) justifies the conditional by
claiming that ‘‘luck is luck, and to the extent that causal fortuitousness is morally irrelevant anywhere it is
morally irrelevant everywhere.’’ My argument differs from Moore’s in at least three ways. First, my
argument better captures the dialectic of the problem of moral luck, because I make impossibilism the
extreme luck-free position, whereas Moore suggests that it is incompatiblism. Second, my argument
makes no dubious assumption that there is no morally relevant difference between any kinds of luck (see
Coffman 2015, pp. 110–111; Hartman 2017, p. 105). Third, my weaker conclusion is that denying only
some kinds of moral luck due to unfairness is untenable, whereas Moore’s stronger conclusion is for the
existence of moral luck.
13 In Hartman (2017, pp. 71–80), I offer an argument that subjunctive conditionals of direct libertarian
freedom are necessarily false, and show that different kinds of subjunctive conditionals of freedom that
might be true are ill-suited for Zimmerman’s account of moral responsibility.
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responsibility differs. Merely Reckless is morally responsible for driving drunk, and
No Start is morally responsible for forming the intention to drive drunk. But Works
Tonight is not morally responsible for anything related to drunk driving. How, then,
can Works Tonight be as blameworthy as the others? Zimmerman’s (2002, pp. 564,
565) answer is that Works Tonight is blameworthy ‘‘tout court’’ or simpliciter in
virtue of the fact that she would have freely driven drunk as Merely Reckless does if
she had not been called into work. Thus, no circumstantial moral luck exists in these
cases, because which of the circumstances outside of their control are actual does
not affect their degree of praiseworthiness or blameworthiness.
Finally, consider the way in which Zimmerman’s view eliminates most
constitutive moral luck. Because the salient difference between Merely Reckless
and Scarred Childhood is luck in formative history, they are equally blameworthy
(Zimmerman 2002, pp. 574, 575). Even though Scarred Childhood’s moral
responsibility has no scope, she is blameworthy in virtue of what she would have
freely done if she had had a different formative history in which her parent was not
killed by a drunk driver. So then, no constitutive moral luck exists in this case,
because which of an agent’s constitutive properties outside of her control are actual
does not affect her degree of praiseworthiness or blameworthiness.
Zimmerman appeals to fairness to motivate this ethical outlook (Hanna 2014,
pp. 692–694). Zimmerman (2002, p. 559) contends that the following general
principle is intuitively attractive: ‘‘[T]he degree to which we are morally responsible
cannot be affected by what is not in our control. Put more pithily: luck is irrelevant
to moral responsibility.’’ Morality would, after all, be unfair if the degree to which
we are morally responsible were determined by something other than what is under
the agent’s control. As Zimmerman writes,
If there is unfairness in the differential judgments [for example, Merely Reckless
is more blameworthy than Works Tonight]—as I believe there is … then this
unfairness … [consists] in ascribing moral responsibility to one … but not
ascribing it to the other (1987, p. 382; italics mine; see also his 1988, p. 136).
I think there may be a (perhaps metaphorical) sense in which it would be
unfair if Bill were more culpable than Ben [Bill and Ben are snipers, only one
of which kills his mark due to luck] (2015, p. 156; italics mine).
Likewise, Zimmerman would say that it would be unfair if Merely Reckless were
more blameworthy than Scarred Childhood due to features of their formative history
outside of their control. Let us refer to the conception of fairness operative here as
subjunctive fairness. If persons S and S* are actually or subjunctively exactly alike
with respect to some event x except regarding factors that are outside of their
control, then it would be unfair if they were to be praiseworthy or blameworthy to
different degrees with respect to x.14
Zimmerman (2002, p. 575), however, concedes that his use of subjunctive
conditionals of freedom may not be able to eliminate all constitutive moral luck,
14 This principle is a revised version of one presented in Greco (1995, p. 89). Notably, Greco rejects the
principle, and affirms resultant, circumstantial, and constitutive moral luck (see Hartman 2017, Ch. 6).
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because at least some of our personal characteristics may be essential to us. That is,
Zimmerman recognizes that we cannot coherently appeal to what a particular person
would freely do in circumstances in which she does not have a particular essential
property or in which she has different essential properties in order to neutralize her
essential constitutive moral luck, since it would not be her if she lost an essential
property or had different essential properties. Thus, essential constitutive moral luck
cannot be eliminated, and essential features of a person’s character outside of her
control can affect the praise and blame she deserves by inclining her to perform and
forgo various kinds of action. If different persons have different essential
constitutive luck, it is impossible for everyone to be in the same counterfactual
circumstances, which implies that there is no absolute equality of moral opportunity.
Zimmerman offers no proposal for eliminating essential constitutive moral luck.
Nevertheless, there is good reason to think that he is committed to denying even this
undeniable kind of constitutive moral luck. Since contingent constitutive luck
involves a kind of lack of control that is pernicious with respect to the fairness of
morality and since essential constitutive luck involves a similar lack of control, we
should expect that essential constitutive luck is also pernicious in a similar way.
One might object that a relevant difference between these kinds of constitutive luck is
that there is no luck involved in the so-called ‘essential constitutive luck’, because lucky
states of affairs must be contingent (see Rescher 1993, pp. 155–157). But this reply
cannot help. Zimmerman (2002, p. 559, cf. 2015, p. 136) uses the lack of control
definition of luck, and both contingent and essential properties may be outside of the
agent’s control in the relevant sense. Furthermore, I argue in Hartman (2017, pp. 23–31)
that we should use the lack of control conception of luck in the moral luck debate,
because it is only this conception that generates the distinctive puzzle involved in the
problem of moral luck (see also Anderson forthcoming; Statman forthcoming).15
One might also object that there can be no unfairness about which essential
properties a person has, and this consideration points to a relevant difference
between these modal varieties of constitutive luck. Zimmerman, however, would
not agree. He thinks, for example, that the capacity to act freely is an essential
property (2002, p. 575) and that it is ‘‘unfair’’ that ‘‘an unfree object (whether
animate or not) never has the opportunity to distinguish itself (or to disgrace itself)
in such a way as to deserve praise (or blame)’’ (1987, p. 385n25). This is precisely
the sort of response we should expect of someone who aims to neutralize luck from
affecting degree of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness.
Finally, one might object that because it is not metaphysically possible to
eliminate essential constitutive moral luck, it poses no threat to the fairness of
morality. This objection, however, cannot be right either, because the argument
contains only a metaphysical reason that explains why essential constitutive moral
luck cannot be eliminated. The argument does not give fairness-relevant moral
reasons why essential constitutive moral luck does not need to be eliminated to
preserve the fairness of morality, while contingent constitutive moral luck must be.
15 For explication and defense of various conceptions of luck including the lack of control account, see
Church and Hartman (forthcoming).
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Allow me to motivate these claims. Suppose, as I have argued in Hartman (2017,
pp. 71–82), that Zimmerman is committed to the truth of subjunctive conditionals of
freedom that are metaphysically contentious in order to eliminate circumstantial and
contingent constitutive moral luck. If it turned out that all such conditionals are
necessarily false, we would not thereby conclude that circumstantial and contingent
constitutive luck to which agents would still be subject can affect moral
responsibility, because those kinds of luck should still be irrelevant to moral
responsibility; they would still be pernicious to moral evaluation. By analogous
reasoning, even if the subjunctive conditionals of freedom that would be able to
neutralize essential constitutive moral luck are necessarily false, essential consti-
tutive luck would still be problematic.16
Therefore, it seems plausible that there is no fairness-relevant moral reason to
affirm the subjunctive fairness conception of morality and to deny the absolute
fairness conception of morality on the assumption that at least some of our personal
characteristics are essential to us.17 Thus, the motivation for Zimmerman’s account
is unstable in this way.18 Either he should embrace the absolute fairness conception
of morality and so embrace moral responsibility skepticism or the Nagelian
paradox, or he should accept that morality is unfair in a way that permits the
existence of contingent constitutive moral luck. Over the next two sections,
however, I argue that the latter option also involves agreeing that morality is unfair
in ways that allow for the existence of circumstantial and resultant moral luck.
4 Denying some circumstantial and constitutive moral luck
Rik Peels (2015, 2017) argues for a modest version of Zimmerman’s view in which
no resultant moral luck exists, and only some kinds of circumstantial and
constitutive moral luck do not exist.19 Peels (2017, p. 220) agrees with Zimmerman
to the extent that at least some kinds of resultant, circumstantial, and constitutive
moral luck would make morality ‘‘unfair’’ (cf. 2017, p. 222). The modesty in Peels’s
(2015) view, however, comes from a desire to avoid what he sees as an absurd
implication of Zimmerman’s account—namely, that a person can be blameworthy
in virtue of what she would freely do in modally distant circumstances even with
character traits different from those she has in the actual world.
To avoid this implication, Peels (2015, p. 77) appeals to an account of luck that
augments the lack of control account in the following way: an event e is lucky for a
16 Why not just think that Zimmerman is defending a luck-free view insofar as it is consistent with
possibilism? According to the dialectic, however, this is not a legitimate approach without an argument
for possibilism (and Zimmerman provides no such argument), because my argument is that the view that
luck is irrelevant to moral responsibility inevitably leads to impossibilism or the Nagelian paradox.
17 Coffman (2015, pp. 104–115) nicely argues that Zimmerman’s account of moral responsibility
presupposes the falsity of what I am calling the absolutely fair conception of morality.
18 For a similar point, see Rosell (2015, pp. 128–129).
19 Enoch and Marmor (2007) also espouse a modest version of Zimmerman’s view, but do so in a way
that differs from Peels in particular ways. Interestingly, Enoch and Marmor do not motivate their view by
any explicit appeal to fairness; elsewhere, Enoch (2010, p. 46) suggests that appealing to fairness is
merely a colorful way of stating the general anti-moral luck intuition.
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person if and only if (1) e is significant for her, (2) she lacks control over e, and (3)
e could easily have failed to occur (cf. Peels forthcoming). To put condition (3) more
precisely, an event e satisfies this modal condition if and only if e occurs in the actual
world but fails to occur in a broad range of close possible worlds in which the relevant
initial conditions are the same. For simplicity, let us refer to Peels’s tripartite account
as ‘luck*’ and the standard lack of control account as ‘luck’. The modal condition
limits lucky* events to those that occur in the actual world and nearby possible worlds.
Since, then, it is not a matter of luck* what an agent would be or do in a distant possible
world, Peels’s account does not imply that an agent can be blameworthy with respect to
counterfactual free actions in a distant possible world. In concrete terms, Peels’s view
implies that Merely Reckless and No Start are equally blameworthy, and that both are
more blameworthy than Scarred Childhood. It is a matter of luck* that No Start fails to
find herself in Merely Reckless’s circumstance, but it is not a matter of luck* that
Scarred Childhood fails to find herself in Merely Reckless’s situation. The possible
world in which Scarred Childhood is in a circumstance like Merely Reckless or No
Start is not close to the actual world at that particular time given all the character and
historical changes that would be required to put her in the same circumstance.
Peels’s view of moral responsibility, then, eliminates all circumstantial and
constitutive moral luck*, but it leaves a lot of circumstantial and constitutive moral
luck intact. After all, most of the situations in which it is possible for us to be are
situations in distant possible worlds. For this reason, Peels’s view eliminates only a
very small proportion of cases of circumstantial and contingent constitutive moral
luck in comparison with Zimmerman’s view.
Importantly, Peels uses the modal condition in his account of luck*—and so
appeals to a metaphysical reason—to distinguish the circumstantial and constitutive
moral luck* that cannot exist from the remaining circumstantial and constitutive
moral luck that morality does permit. He, however, offers no fairness-relevant moral
reason to justify this division (cf. Hartman 2017, pp. 25–29; 65, 66); after all, what
fairness-relevant moral reason could he appeal to in order to justify differential
blameworthiness between Merely Reckless and No Start, on the one hand, and
Scarred Childhood, on the other? Peels’s distinction between problematic circum-
stantial and constitutive moral luck* and benign circumstantial and constitutive
moral luck, then, is unmotivated with respect to the ideal of fairness. Although I
have my doubts about whether there is any plausible way to motivate Peels’s
distinction, my point here is merely that appealing to fairness cannot do it.
5 Denying only resultant moral luck
The most popular position in the moral luck debate is that circumstantial and
constitutive moral luck do exist but that resultant moral luck does not.20 Call this
position the Asymmetry View. In concrete terms, the view is that Killer and Merely
20 The denial of resultant moral luck has been called ‘‘the Standard View’’ (Mackenzie 2017, p. 95) and
‘‘the Orthodox View’’ (Ferrante 2009, p. 276), and their assessment is corroborated by my own catalogue
of published opinions (see Hartman 2017, p. 129).
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Reckless are equally blameworthy. Nevertheless, Merely Reckless is more
blameworthy than No Start, because only Merely Reckless drives drunk; and No
Start is more blameworthy than Works Tonight and Scarred Childhood, because
only No Start intends to drive drunk. According to this view, there is a morally
significant difference between the kinds of luck that rule out two agents from
performing the same kind of action or omission and the sort of luck that operates
after two agents perform the same kind of action or omission.
A common justification for the Asymmetry View is that it would be unjust or
unfair for Killer to deserve more blame than Merely Reckless but not for Merely
Reckless to deserve more blame than Works Tonight (Swenson manuscript; Wolf
2001, p. 6, 18).21 On this actualist fairness conception of morality, if persons S and
S* are actually exactly alike with respect to some event x except regarding factors
that are outside of their control, then it would be unfair if they were to be
praiseworthy or blameworthy to different degrees with respect to x. So, because
Killer and Merely Reckless actually operate their vehicles in the same way, it would
be unfair if they were to deserve different degrees of blame.22
One might argue for the claim that the fairness of morality rules out only
resultant moral luck in part by showing that extant circumstantial and constitutive
moral luck is compatible with total equality of moral opportunity. That is, there is
no deep unfairness in accepting circumstantial and constitutive moral luck because
all persons enjoy equality of moral opportunity, but there would be such unfairness
in accepting resultant moral luck (Swenson manuscript). Roger Crisp (2017, p. 17)
explores this idea by suggesting that it is always open to agents to do the right thing,
and the degree of a person’s praiseworthiness or blameworthiness for an action is in
part determined by the difficulty involved in doing the right thing:
A harder choice may be more praiseworthy, so to this extent the circumstantial
bad moral luck of the man who stayed in [Nazi] Germany was counterbal-
anced by the greater moral opportunities available to him. And as it becomes
more difficult to make the correct choice, so it becomes a lesser wrong [and
the agent less blameworthy] not to make it.
So, the person who faces bad circumstantial or constitutive luck finds herself in
higher stakes situations in which it is harder to do the right thing. And because the
likelihood of her doing the right thing is generally lower in higher stakes situations
all other things being equal, she will be more praiseworthy if she does the right thing
21 Wolf (1990) affirms the existence of circumstantial and constitutive moral luck in other writings; in
fact, the existence of circumstantial and constitutive moral luck is an entailment of her broader
compatibilist commitments (see Hartman 2017, pp. 54, 55). Various other philosophers reject resultant
moral luck as unjust or unfair without specifying whether they accept circumstantial and constitutive
moral luck (Cushman and Greene 2012, p. 273; Parker 1984, p. 274).
22 A different justification of the Asymmetry View is that attributability accounts of moral responsibility
imply the denial of only resultant moral luck (Khoury 2018; Talbert 2017). See Levy (2011, pp. 180–212)
for an argument against attributability views. Yet another justification is that we should accept moral luck
if and only if it is required for being morally responsible for actions, and admitting resultant moral luck is
not necessary for being morally responsible for actions—but admitting circumstantial and constitutive
moral luck is (Rivera-Lo´pez 2016). See Hartman (2017, pp. 107–109) for a response to Rivera-Lo´pez.
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and less blameworthy if she does the wrong thing. The opposite, of course, holds in
lower stakes situations. Since the likelihood of her doing the right thing is generally
higher in circumstances in which it is easier to do the right thing all other things
being equal, she will be less praiseworthy if she does the right thing and more
blameworthy if she does the wrong thing. So, one might think that this kind of
equality of moral opportunity shows that there is no unfairness involved in
accepting circumstantial and constitutive moral luck (Swenson manuscript).23
I, however, challenge the claim that there is equality of moral opportunity even if
we suppose that agents can always do the right thing and that degrees of
praiseworthiness and blameworthiness are sensitive to degrees of difficulty. First,
higher and lower stakes circumstances involve different kinds of moral risks. And as
Linda Zagzebski (1994, p. 409) argues, ‘‘[w]e do not get to decide initially how
much of a risk we want to take,’’ because it is often not up to us whether we find
ourselves in higher or lower stakes circumstances. Someone who finds herself in
certain higher stakes circumstances by luck may make choices that result in her
being overall more praiseworthy and/or less blameworthy than if she had made
choices in particular lower stakes circumstances. Likewise, someone who finds
herself in certain lower stakes circumstances by luck may make choices that result
in her being overall more praiseworthy and/or less blameworthy than if she had
made choices in particular higher stakes circumstances. Herein lies a remaining
source of unfairness. Second, I am dubious that weighting difficulty in proportion to
degrees of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness could ever be precise enough to
grant everyone equal moral opportunities (Zagzebski 1994, p. 409). To be clear, I
am not saying that it is impossible to do the math; I am expressing doubt that
degrees of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness are as fine-grained as the math
requires. Thus, the suggestion that accepting circumstantial and constitutive moral
luck as well as difficulty-weighted praiseworthiness and blameworthiness generates
universal equality of moral opportunity is not a promising suggestion. I conclude
that this kind of partial fairness-based justification for the Asymmetry View fails.
Let us turn to consider my positive argument for why there is no good fairness-
based justification for the Asymmetry View. The basic argument is that the features
that make circumstantial and constitutive moral luck benign with respect to morality
are also present in cases of resultant moral luck, which makes it benign too. It is
helpful to think through this claim concretely with Killer and Merely Reckless as
the case of resultant luck, and Merely Reckless and Works Tonight as the case of
circumstantial luck.24
There are two plausible moral principles that provide a minimal kind of core
fairness that is required for moral responsibility, and both principles are
asymmetrically satisfied in a way that differentiates the blameworthiness of Merely
Reckless and Works Tonight.
Here is the principle of dependence:
23 Crisp (2017, p. 18) considers this position, but ultimately rejects it.
24 I choose Works Tonight instead of No Start to pair with Merely Reckless, because it is more obviously
a case of circumstantial luck (see footnote 5).
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An agent is praiseworthy or blameworthy for an event only if the occurrence
of that event at least partially depends on her free action or omission.
The event of Merely Reckless’s driving drunk is an event that depends at least in
part on her free choices or omissions. Even if Merely Reckless is too cognitively
impaired to freely operate her vehicle at the time she is driving drunk, her moral
responsibility for driving drunk plausibly traces back to (and so depends on) an
earlier omission to make plans about how to get home safely. Of course, since
Works Tonight does not drive drunk, no such event depends on her free action or
omission, which precludes her blameworthiness for driving drunk. So, the principle
of dependence provides a reason to think that Merely Reckless may be more
blameworthy than Works Tonight, because it provides a necessary condition on
moral responsibility that is satisfied in one case but not the other.
Here is the principle of fair opportunity:
An agent is praiseworthy for an exemplary action or blameworthy for a wrong
action only if she had a fair opportunity to avoid performing the action.25
I leave it open whether we should understand ‘fair opportunity’ in a compatibilist
way to include merely the agent’s having normative competence and situational
control (cf. Brink and Nelkin 2013) or in an incompatibilist way to include the
agent’s also having alternative possibilities at the moment of choice (cf. Otsuka
1998, 2009). We may stipulate that Merely Reckless had the relevant kind of fair
opportunity to avoid driving drunk, because she could have freely chosen in the
relevant sense to make different transportation preparations or not to drink at all.
Since, however, Works Tonight does not have an opportunity to drive drunk, she
does not have a fair opportunity of the relevant kind to avoid driving drunk, which
rules out being blameworthy for driving drunk. (Of course, the more natural
explanation for why Works Tonight is not blameworthy is that Works Tonight does
not drive drunk. The point here is that there is an asymmetry with respect to a
necessary condition on moral responsibility.) So, the principle of fair opportunity
also provides a reason to think that Merely Reckless may be more blameworthy than
Works Tonight.
Plausibly, satisfying these principles is what makes cases of circumstantial moral
luck consonant with a fairness core of morality. It seems plausible that anyone
moved by the fairness-based justification for the Asymmetry View would agree.
Importantly, the basic ideas in the principles of dependence and fair opportunity
are satisfied also in the comparative case of Killer and Merely Reckless in such a
way that they leave open the possibility of resultant moral luck. The event of killing
the pedestrian by drunk driving depends on Killer’s choice to drive drunk or traces
back to a relevant past free action or omission, and thus Killer’s deadly consequence
satisfies the core idea behind the principle of dependence. And since Merely
Reckless does not kill a pedestrian, no such event depends on her free action or
25 Philosophers such as Wolf (1990) and Nelkin (2011) who endorse an asymmetry in the conditions of
praiseworthiness and blameworthiness may revise this principle as follows: an agent is blameworthy for a
wrong action only if she had a fair opportunity to avoid performing the action.
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omission; thus, Merely Reckless cannot be additionally blameworthy for killing a
pedestrian. Furthermore, Killer had a fair opportunity to avoid killing the pedestrian
in part because she had a fair opportunity to avoid driving drunk; another part of
what makes her opportunity to avoid killing the pedestrian a fair one is that the
consequence of killing a pedestrian is a foreseeable result of drunk driving. But
then, the same basic considerations that make circumstantial and constitutive moral
luck benign on the Asymmetry View should also make foreseeable resultant moral
luck benign too.26 Thus, if the principles of dependence and fair opportunity are
what make circumstantial and constitutive moral luck fair in a certain way with
respect to morality, then there is no good unfairness objection to foreseeable
resultant moral luck, because the basic ideas behind those principles are satisfied
also in cases of foreseeable resultant moral luck.
Furthermore, resultant moral luck does not involve involuntary moral risk in the
way that circumstantial and constitutive moral luck do. Recall that because the
agent often does not choose whether she finds herself in higher or lower stakes
circumstances owing to her circumstantial and constitutive luck, the agent does not
decide how much of a moral risk she wants to take with respect to doing the right
thing.27 This kind of involuntary moral risk is not present in cases of resultant moral
luck. Killer, for example, could easily have avoided being subject to the moral risk
of causing the death of a pedestrian via drunk driving by forgoing the consumption
of alcohol or by making foolproof plans to avoid driving. In general terms, if
someone wants to avoid the moral risk involved with bad resultant moral luck, then
she can avoid performing morally bad actions that have foreseeable bad
consequences, and if a person wants a chance to have good resultant moral luck,
then she should perform morally good actions that have foreseeable good
consequences. Unlike in cases of circumstantial and constitutive moral luck, it is
up to the agent what kinds of risks she takes with respect to resultant moral luck.
6 Concluding thoughts
I have argued that various intermediary positions in the moral luck debate—that is,
positions that allow some kinds of moral luck to exist but deny others—are unmotivated
according to the ideal of fairness, because there is no fairness-relevant moral reason to
allow certain kinds of moral luck to exist and to deny others. The upshot is that
philosophers who hold such intermediary views on grounds of fairness should either (1)
embrace absolute fairness as the standard of morality, and so embrace either
responsibility skepticism or Nagelian paradox, or (2) agree that there is no good
objection to the existence of constitutive, circumstantial, and resultant moral luck on
grounds of fairness. If philosophers who occupy these intermediary positions take route
26 In Hartman (2017, pp. 90–93), I argue that all extant resultant moral luck is foreseeable resultant moral
luck.
27 It is plausible that ease and difficulty of circumstances do affect degrees of praiseworthiness and
blameworthiness (Nelkin 2016), even though they are not weighted precisely enough to provide equality
of moral opportunity.
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(2), then at least some of them will have motivation to abandon their positions, because a
prominent motivation for rejecting moral luck is on the grounds of fairness. And if they
take route (2)—as I think they should—they would have reason to think that morality is
not absolutely, subjunctively, or actually fair in the ways defined in this paper.
Even if morality is unfair in these ways, morality can retain a fairness core if some
version of compatibilism or libertarianism is true. Compatibilism, the view that an
action’s being causally determined by past states of affairs and laws of nature does not
itself rule out acting freely or responsibly, fits nicely with the position that constitutive,
circumstantial, and resultant moral luck exist, because compatibilism amounts to the
claim that causal moral luck is not incoherent. One interesting example of this is Paul
Russell’s (2017) work. It is, however, less obvious that accepting constitutive,
circumstantial, and resultant moral luck fits well with incompatibilism, which implies
that causal moral luck cannot exist.28 Could there be a fairness-relevant moral reason
for the incompatibilist to deny causal moral luck, and yet affirm constitutive,
circumstantial, and resultant moral luck? There may be such a reason if alternative
possibilities at the moment of choice are required to furnish the agent with a fair
opportunity to avoid performing certain actions. I am merely pointing to what may be a
fairness-relevant moral reason for why causal moral luck cannot exist but constitutive,
circumstantial, and resultant moral luck can. In future work, I will explore the idea that
libertarians should accept the unfairness of morality, and so accept resultant,
circumstantial, and constitutive moral luck.29
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Appendix: The unfairness of morality
There are at least five ways in which morality is unfair concerning moral properties
other than deserving praise and blame. First, different luck can generate differences
in what people are responsible for, because luck affects the scope of an agent’s
responsibility, even if we suppose that luck does not affect her degree of moral
responsibility (Peels 2015; Zimmerman 2002). It is Killer’s bad luck that makes him
28 Russell (2008, p. 318) appears to assert that incompatibilism and the absolute fairness conception of
morality necessarily go together. But it seems wrong that if one accepts incompatibilism, then one must
also affirm the absolute fairness conception of morality.
29 In Hartman (unpublished manuscript), I explore the motivation that libertarians have for accepting
resultant moral luck with respect to character-necessitated actions such as Martin Luther’s famous refusal
to recant his theological position: ‘‘Here I stand. I can do no other.’’
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morally responsible for more events—namely, the killing of a pedestrian—than
Merely Reckless. The same goes for Merely Reckless’s being morally responsible
for more things than No Start, Works Tonight, and Scarred Childhood, and for No
Start’s being morally responsible for more things than Works Tonight and Scarred
Childhood. Morality, then, is unfair with respect to that for which an agent is
morally responsible.30
Second, different luck can generate different deontic or virtue-based imperatives.
Even if there is no resultant moral luck, Killer’s bad luck would still create moral
obligations or virtuous directives to take responsibility for killing the pedestrian and
to repair the moral damage that she has caused as far as it is reasonable and in her
power (Hartman 2017, pp. 92, 93; Enoch 2012; Wolf 2001).31 That is, Killer ought
to apologize to the family of the one she killed and to find other ways to make
amends. Merely Reckless, of course, does not have these particular obligations,
because she does not kill a pedestrian. Thus, morality is unfair with respect to what
deontic or virtue-theoretic imperatives an agent has.32
Third, different luck can generate differences in moral taint. As Marina Oshana
(2006, p. 355, 356) describes, an entity is tainted if it is altered in a way that
eliminates some of its valuable features: ‘‘One is said to be morally tainted when
one’s moral personality has been compromised by the introduction of something
that produces disfigurement of the moral psyche.’’ Consider another variation on the
case of the reckless driver. No Fault, a sixth character, performs perfectly behind the
wheel, but she kills a child who emerges from a pile of leaves. Clearly, No Fault is
not blameworthy for killing the child, because her driving is not faulty in any way.
Nevertheless, we expect No Fault to experience guilt, shame, remorse, and regret
about killing the child—that is, to feel what Williams (1981, pp. 28, 29) famously
calls ‘‘agent regret.’’ No Fault is morally tainted by the way in which killing the
child shatters her positive self-image, alienates her from herself, and stigmatizes her
as a child killer. Of course, Merely Reckless does not acquire moral taint of this
kind or degree, even though it is plausible to say that her blameworthy action taints
her in some way (Stump 2004). Furthermore, people can acquire moral taint through
bad circumstantial and constitutive luck. In the novel Sophie’s Choice, the Nazis
force Sophie to make a decision about which of her two children should live, and
her refusal to choose would amount to the death of both; she opts to preserve one
life and later commits suicide on account of the crushing guilt. Moreover, even
innocent children of prominent Nazi officers experienced guilt and shame due to the
way in which their practical identities were related to shameful persons and events
(Sereny 2001). Thus, morality is unfair with respect to whether a person acquires
moral taint.
30 This is true especially in cases of collective responsibility in which a person is a contributor to an
outcome that might not have turned out to be bad but for the independent contributions of others (see
Szigeti 2014).
31 Haji (2016) argues that if constitutive luck precludes the ability to do otherwise, then we do not have
moral obligations either.
32 A potential further source of unfairness would be moral dilemmas set up by conflicting ‘‘non-
negotiable’’ moral obligations (Tessman 2014, Ch. 1; Nagel 1979, p. 34n9).
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Fourth, different luck can generate differences in being a good or bad person.
Nagel (1979, p. 26) provides a famous example of the way in which diachronic
circumstantial luck can affect whether we become better or worse persons:
Someone who was an officer in a concentration camp might have led a quiet
and harmless life if the Nazis had never come to power in Germany. And
someone who led a quiet and harmless life in Argentina might have become an
officer in a concentration camp if he had not left Germany for business reasons
in 1930.
In fact, recent work in social psychology, the so-called situationist literature,
supports the claim that the circumstances in which we find ourselves matter a lot
more than we have previously thought for being a good or bad person, because
almost all of us would do bad things in certain circumstances (Doris 2002; Miller
2013). Furthermore, certain kinds of capacity-related constitutive luck can set up
people to become bad. A familiar characterization of a psychopath, for example,
involves the inability to tell the difference between moral and conventional rules,
and a lack of various emotions such as empathy. Thus, psychopaths are not able to
appreciate the respective strengths that moral and conventional reasons should have
in their deliberations. This lack of normative competence makes them more likely to
engage in egoistic behavior and so to become worse persons (Shoemaker 2015).
Thus, morality is unfair with respect to the degree to which an agent is a good or bad
person, and even whether someone is a good or bad person.
Finally, different luck can generate differences in flourishing. Human flourishing
involves appreciating beauty, engaging in projects, having good relationships,
possessing good character, being free, and having knowledge to name just a few
features of the good life. Bad luck can compromise flourishing by depriving a
person of the means to participate in those activities; for example, a person might
acquire chronic fatigue syndrome and thereby have to withdraw from family,
friendships, work, hobbies, and religious activities. Bad luck can also dislodge some
of the agent’s valuable properties related to her flourishing. For example, an agent
may lose freedom due to enslavement, lose knowledge and self-direction due to
amnesia or Alzheimer’s disease, or lose good character due to traumatic events
(Nussbaum 2001, p. 328). Furthermore, different luck can generate differences in
desert of flourishing. If we deserve to flourish in proportion to our moral virtue and
whether we are morally virtuous is affected by luck,33 the degree to which one
deserves to flourish is also subject to luck. Thus, morality is also unfair with respect
to how well people flourish, and perhaps also how much people deserve to flourish.
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